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Abstract
One important aspect of metacognition is the ability to accurately evaluate one’s performance. People vary widely in their
metacognitive ability and in general are too confident when evaluating their performance. This often leads to poor decision
making with potentially disastrous consequences. To further our understanding of the neural underpinnings of these
processes, this fMRI study investigated inter-individual differences in metacognitive ability and effects of trial-by-trial vari-
ation in subjective feelings of confidence when making metacognitive assessments. Participants (N¼308) evaluated their
performance in a high-level social and cognitive reasoning task. The results showed that higher metacognitive accuracy
was associated with a decrease in activation in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, an area previously linked to metacog-
nition on perception and memory. Moreover, the feeling of confidence about one’s choices was associated with an increase
of activation in reward, memory and motor related areas including bilateral striatum and hippocampus, while less confi-
dence was associated with activation in areas linked with negative affect and uncertainty, including dorsomedial prefrontal
and bilateral orbitofrontal cortex. This might indicate that positive affect is related to higher confidence thereby biasing
metacognitive decisions towards overconfidence. In support, behavioural analyses revealed that increased confidence was
associated with lower metacognitive accuracy.
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Introduction
Metacognition is the ability to think about and monitor one’s
own cognitive processes (Dunlosky and Metcalfe, 2009).
Examples include planning a certain task, monitoring and com-
prehending its progress and evaluating one’s own performance.
In this study, we will focus on inter-individual differences in the
latter aspect of metacognition, the ability to accurately evaluate
one’s own performance (i.e. metacognitive accuracy). A striking
fact is that people are generally not very good in evaluating
their own performance. The most famous example of this is the
well-studied ‘better-than-average’ effect, the tendency for peo-
ple to evaluate themselves more positively than they evaluate
most other people (for reviews see Hoorens, 1993; Alicke and
Govorun, 2005). For example, in one of the earliest studies docu-
menting this effect, 94% of faculty members rated themselves
as above-average teachers (Cross, 1977), while this can of course
only be true for less then 50%.
The trouble with bad self-judgement and overconfidence
in one’s own judgment is that it can have disastrous conse-
quences. High rates of entrepreneurial failure, global stock
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market crashes, explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger and
the nuclear accident at Chernobyl have all been blamed on
overconfidence (Moore and Healy, 2008). Given the importance
of these problems for society in general, the aim of the current
fMRI study was to get a better understanding of neural proc-
esses involved in metacognitive accuracy, the feeling of confi-
dence in one’s own judgment and the potential relation
between metacognitive accuracy and overconfidence. To this
end, we assessed the (accuracy of) feelings of confidence about
one’s own performance in a high-level factual and social rea-
soning task in a large sample of healthy participants (N¼ 308).
By that, we also intended to extend previous findings about
metacognition on memory and perception to higher-level cog-
nition and to achieve sufficient statistical power, which has
often been lacking in the analysis of inter-individual differences
(Yarkoni et al., 2009).
Previous studies have found that metacognitive accuracy
can be distinguished from task performance and varies widely
across individuals (for a review see Fleming and Dolan, 2012).
Investigations in patients with frontal lobe lesions, for instance,
showed impairments in metamemory accuracy while having
preserved memory retrieval (Pannu and Kaszniak, 2005). Several
lines of research point to a critical role of anterior prefrontal
cortex (aPFC) structure and function as a basis of such individ-
ual differences (Fleming et al., 2010; Rounis et al., 2010,
Yokoyama et al., 2010; Baird et al., 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013).
Furthermore, lesion studies confirmed the involvement of the
aPFC in metacognition accuracy (Del Cul, et al., 2009; Fleming
et al., 2014).
Concerning the specific association between aPFC activity
and metacognitive ability, previous fMRI studies are not conclu-
sive (some showing increase, others decrease in aPFC activity
for enhanced metacognitive performance, e.g Yokoyama et al.,
2010, Fleming et al., 2014). These fMRI studies on individual dif-
ferences in metacognition accuracy used relatively small sam-
ple sizes (e.g. Fleming et al., 2012: n¼ 23; Yokoyama et al., 2010:
n¼ 25). When performing regression analyses and working with
modest effect sizes (r¼ 0.2–0.3; which is typical in psychological
research) sample sizes of 100þparticipants are necessary to
reach 80% power (Yarkoni, 2009). If power is lower, results are
less reliable, reflected in over-estimated effect-sizes or, even
worse, false positives (Yarkoni, 2009). Therefore, we investi-
gated metacognition in a large sample of more than 300
participants.
Moreover, previous studies investigating individual differ-
ences in metacognitive accuracy have focused on metacognitive
judgments on simple perceptual decision making and memory
performance. For example, participants had to either choose if
they saw a face or a house (Fleming et al., 2012), or recognize a
specific dot pattern (Yokoyama et al., 2010), and then indicate
how confident they were in their decision. Previous studies
showed that even though aPFC is involved in both metacogni-
tive tasks, there is some specificity concerning functional con-
nectivity and structural patterns associated with metacognitive
performance in perceptual and memory tasks (Baird et al., 2013,
McCurdy et al., 2013). What is unknown to date is what the neu-
ral correlates of metacognition on high-level cognitive process-
ing are. We therefore applied a task that asks for confidence
ratings on two types of such high-level cognitive tasks, namely
inferences about others’ mental states or about physical events
(EmpaToM task, Kanske et al., 2015).
Furthermore, previous fMRI studies have produced mixed
results with regard to the neural underpinnings of subjective
levels of confidence when making metacognitive assessments.
For example, Chua, et al. (2006) found that higher subjective con-
fidence ratings were associated with increased activation in the
anterior and posterior cingulate, bilateral caudate, medial pre-
frontal cortex and several medial temporal lobe (MTL) regions
situated around the hippocampus. Kim and Cabeza (2009) found
similar MTL regions more active during high confidence trials,
and additionally several prefrontal regions more active during
less confidence trials. Moritz and colleagues (2006) found that an
increase in recognition confidence was associated with the MTL
and anterior and posterior cingulate cortex, while less confi-
dence was associated with the superior posterior parietal cor-
tex. Fleming et al. (2012) found no positive correlation with
confidence during a face vs house discrimination task but less
confidence was associated with increased activation in dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex, right posterior parietal cortex and bi-
lateral rostral lateral prefrontal cortex. Although it seems that
the association between MTL regions and increased confidence
is fairly consistent, the role of the other brain regions seems
less clear-cut, especially in relation to less confidence. Again,
a large sample size could provide further insights into which
effects are reliable and which are not.
Finally, we explored whether overconfidence is associated
with poorer metacognitive ability. Fleming et al.(2014) have
coined the term ‘metacognitive bias’ (i.e. a difference in subject-
ive confidence despite basic task performance remaining con-
stant) and we aimed at investigating whether such a bias
(overconfidence) is related to poorer metacognitive ability.
Taken together, the main goals of the this study were: (i) to
investigate the neural basis of inter-individual differences in
metacognitive accuracy in a large sample that allows reliable
assessment; (ii) to assess metacognition not on a simple percep-
tion or memory task, but during high-level inferential cognitive
processes; (iii) to assess neural networks underlying subjective
confidence; and (iv) to study the relationship between overcon-
fidence and metacognitive ability.
Methods
Participants
In total, 332 participants participated in the study, which was
part of the ReSource project (Singer et al, 2015), a large-scale
longitudinal study focused on investigating the effects of men-
tal training. Twenty-four participants had to be excluded due to
study dropout (n¼ 5), dropout from MRI measurements (n¼ 1) or
missing data due to technical, scheduling or health issues
(n¼ 18), leaving a final sample of 308 participants (age mean-
¼ 41 years, s.d.¼ 9, 178 female, 283 right-handed), who com-
pleted the task successfully. All participants gave written
informed consent in accordance with the declaration of
Helsinki. The study was approved by the Ethics committees of
the University of Leipzig and the Humboldt University Berlin.
Task: EmpaToM
Metacognition was measured at the end of each trial of the
EmpaToM task, which has been described in detail elsewhere
(Kanske et al., 2015). The task was designed to measure em-
pathy, compassion, Theory of Mind (ToM), and metacognition.
During the EmpaToM, participants are presented with a se-
quence of stimuli in each trial (Figure 1). After a fixation cross
(1–3 s), the name of a person (1 s) who would subsequently be
speaking in a short video (15 s) was presented. Exemplary
video stories and questions can be found in Supplementary
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Material (Supplement S1). The videos differed in emotionality
(emotionally neutral vs negative contents) and in what question
they gave rise to (ToM vs nonToM). In total, 48 trials were pre-
sented (12 per condition). After each video, participants were
asked to rate how they felt (on a scale from negative to positive;
4 s) and how much compassion they felt for the person in the
previous video (scale from none to very much; 4 s). After a fix-
ation cross (1–3 s), a multiple choice question with three re-
sponse options was presented. The questions demanded either
ToM reasoning or factual reasoning on the contents of the pre-
vious video. Participants had a maximum of 14 s to select one of
the response options, which was then highlighted and re-
mained on the screen for another second. After a fixation cross
(0–2 s), a confidence rating was presented asking participants
how confident they were to have chosen the correct response in
the previous question (4 s). The confidence rating consisted of a
continuous rating scale and the rated position was coded in val-
ues from 1 (uncertain) to 720 (certain). The rating scale numbers
were not visible to the participant on the rating scale, but six
sections indicated by seven reference lines (1–2: 1–120; 2–3: 121–
240; 3–4: 241–360; 4–5: 361–480; 5–6: 481–600; 6–7: 601–720) were
given to guide people’s responses. In the present manuscript,
we focus on the confidence ratings.
Measure of metacognitive ability: receiver operating
characteristic (ROC)
To take response bias into account, signal-detection-theory
(Green and Swets, 1966) was used to quantify individual differ-
ences in metacognitive ability (here defined as the ability to ac-
curately evaluate one’s own cognitive performance). Given the
three-way multiple choice set-up of the metacognition for cog-
nition task, we did not apply the meta d-prime (Maniscalco and
Lau, 2012) metric, but instead chose the well-established re-
ceiver operator characteristic (ROC) to quantify meta-cognitive
accuracy (Fleming and Lau, 2014). Similar to Fleming et al. (2010)
we constructed type II ROC curves for each participant. We used
the perfcurve function in Matlab (Version 8.5, Mathworks Inc.,
Natick, MA), entering accuracies in the task (0 or 1) as the pre-
dicted state variable (i.e. true class labels) and binned confi-
dence ratings (1–6, corresponding to the six sections of the
reference lines: 1–120; 121–240; 241–360; 361–480; 481–600; 601–
720) as prediction scores. The function calculates true positive
rate and false positive rate for all possible thresholds of the con-
fidence rating. These ‘hit’ and ‘false alarm’ rates describe the
points of the individual, empirical ROC curves. As a measure of
overall metacognitive ability, we computed the area under the
curve (AUC) using trapezoidal approximation as implemented
in the perfcurve function. Higher AUC scores indicate better
metacognitive ability.
If overconfidence is associated with poorer metacognitive
ability, we would expect a negative correlation between the
two. However in general increased confidence is associated
with higher accuracy in the primary task and this was also the
case in our study (r¼ 0.26; n¼ 308; P< 0.001). Therefore, it is im-
portant to control for mean task accuracy when measuring
metacognitive bias (i.e. a difference in subjective confidence
despite basic task performance remaining constant; Fleming
et al., 2014). To investigate the relationship between overconfi-
dence and metacognitive ability we performed a partial correl-
ation between confidence and the AUC score, while controlling
for mean task accuracy.
MRI data acquisition
Brain images were acquired on a 3T Siemens Verio scanner
(Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen), equipped with a 32-chan-
nel head coil. Structural images were acquired using a MPRAGE
T1-weighted sequence (TR¼ 2300 ms; TE¼ 2.98 ms; TI¼ 900; flip
angle¼ 9; 176 sagittal slices; matrix size¼ 256 256;
FOV¼ 256 mm; slice thickness¼ 1 mm), yielding a final voxel size
of 1 1 1 mm. For the functional imaging, a T2*-weighted
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence was used (TR¼ 2000 ms;
TE¼ 27 ms, flip angle¼ 90). Thirty-seven axial slices
were acquired covering the whole brain with a slice thickness
of 3 mm, in-plane resolution 3  3 mm, 1 mm interslice gap,
Fig. 1. EmpaToM trial sequence. Following a 2 (Emotionality of the Video)  2 (ToM Requirements) design, four different video types were presented for each actor:
Emotionally negative and neutral videos; videos with and without ToM demands, thereby leading to ToM vs factual reasoning questions. After each video, participants
rated their own affect and their compassion for the person in the video. Subsequently, they answered a ToM or non-ToM (i.e. factual reasoning) question about the
video. After each question, participants rated their confidence regarding their performance in the question. These ratings were used to calculate metacognition
performance.
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FOV¼ 210 mm; matrix size 70  70. Each run began with three
dummy volumes that were discarded from further analysis.
fMRI data analysis
Images were analysed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). All volumes were coregis-
tered to the SPM single-subject canonical EPI image, slice-time
corrected and realigned to the mean image volume in order to
correct for head motion. A high resolution anatomical image of
each subject was first coregistered to the SPM single-subject ca-
nonical T1 image and then to the average functional image. The
transformation matrix obtained by normalizing the anatomical
image was then used to normalize functional images to MNI
space. The normalized images (3 mm isotropic voxel) were spa-
tially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of full-width half-max-
imum at 8 mm. A high-pass temporal filter with cutoff of 128 s
was applied to remove low-frequency drifts from the data.
After preprocessing, as part of the first level of analysis, stat-
istical analysis was carried out using the general linear model
(Friston et al., 1994). Onset and duration of the four video types
(neutral non-ToM; neutral ToM; emotional non-ToM; emotional
ToM), their corresponding questions and the rating periods (af-
fect, compassion and confidence) were modeled. These regres-
sors were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response
function (HRF). Effects of head motion were accounted for by
modeling the six motion parameters for each subject as effects
of no interest in the design matrix. To further reduce influence
of potential noise-artifacts, we used the RobustWLS Toolbox
(Diedrichsen and Shadmehr, 2005), which down-weights images
with higher noise variance through a weighted-least-squares
approach.
To measure neural correlates of inter-individual differences
in metacognitive accuracy, a ‘metacognition contrast’ was cre-
ated in the first-level analysis by subtracting the average BOLD
response of the affect and compassion ratings from the confi-
dence rating for each participant. This contrast was related to
behavioural metacognitive accuracy in the second-level ana-
lysis (see below). To measure effects of trial-by-trial variation of
subjective feelings of confidence, the rated confidence (1–720)
for each trial was included as a parametric modulation of the
confidence rating period (i.e. the time during which people rate
how confident they were about their decision). To make sure
that the effects of rated confidence were not confounded by
motor processes involved in making the rating, the duration of
the rating process (time till last button press) and moved dis-
tance of the rating marker (distance between start and end
marker position) were additionally included in the design as
parametric modulators of the confidence rating regressor. Since
these were entered into the design matrix prior to the rated con-
fidence regressor, the sequential orthogonalization imple-
mented in SPM would remove variance related to the duration
and extent of button presses from the rated confidence.
Furthermore, we also checked whether the effect of confidence
on neural activity would differ across the four conditions of the
2  2 factorial task design [emotionality (neutral vs emotional)
by ToM demand (non-ToM vs ToM question)]. To this end, we
ran additional models with separate regressors for confidence
rating epochs and their parametric modulation for the four con-
ditions (i.e. neutral non-ToM, neutral ToM, emotional non-ToM,
emotional ToM).
In the second level of analysis, first-level contrast images for
the ‘metacognition contrast’ [confidence rating(affectþ com-
passion rating)/2] were entered into an SPM regression analysis
with the AUC score (i.e. inter-individual differences in metacog-
nitive accuracy) as the only regressor. This analysis was re-
peated for AUC scores calculated separately on neutral,
emotional, non-ToM and ToM trials in order to check for con-
sistency across these conditions. To assess intra-individual
differences in subjective feelings of confidence, first-level par-
ameter estimates of subjective confidence ratings were entered
into a one-sample t-test for random effects analysis at the
second-level. Additionally, differences and commonalities
across the task conditions were checked by entering contrasts
of the four parametric modulators into a 2  2 factorial design
(emotionality  ToM demands in the question) and evaluating
effects separately for each of the two factor levels as well as
contrasting them against each other. Significant activity for all
analyses was defined by a voxel-wise FWE of P< 0.05 corrected
for the whole brain.
Results
Behavioural results
Participants’ mean AUC score was 0.69 (range: 0.46–0.92;
s.d.¼ 0.094), mean confidence score was 479 (range: 210–696;
s.d.¼ 84) and mean accuracy was 61% (range: 31–88%; s.d.¼ 12%;
split per condition: neutral non-ToM¼ 56.9%; neutral ToM¼
63.8%; emotional non-ToM¼ 55.3%; emotional ToM¼ 66.8%).
A significant negative partial correlation was found between
the confidence and AUC score (r¼0.126; n¼ 308; P¼ 0.027),
when controlling for mean accuracy.
It is possible that the negative correlation was a spurious re-
sult of how we measured (i.e. using trapezoidal approximation)
AUC. The main computational issue with trapezoidal approxi-
mation is that it systematically underestimates area under the
‘true’ ROC curve composed of infinitely many points, and this
underestimation can become more pronounced as response
bias increases (Hanley and McNeil, 1982). Thus, this issue of
underestimation could possibly explain why confidence and
AUC are negatively correlated. This potential confound is ex-
plained in detail in Supplementary Figure 1.
To rule out the potential deflationary account, we also esti-
mated the ROC curve using the parametric binormal ROC model
(with matlab code provided by Brown and Davis, 2006). This
method does not rely on trapezoidal approximation and thus
should be robust to the bias of underestimation. However, a dis-
advantage of this method is that it relies on the assumption
that the prediction scores of the two classes (i.e. correct and
incorrect trials) follow a binormal distribution or can be monot-
onously transformed to achieve a normal distribution, an as-
sumption that is difficult to assess in practice. Therefore, we
used the classical nonparametric curves for all analyses in the
manuscript and only checked the critical partial correlation
using the binormal ROC model. AUC scores for both methods
were highly correlated (r¼ 0.98) and had very similar mean val-
ues (0.690 and 0.696), arguing for the validity of the parametric
approach. Importantly, running the partial correlation analysis
on the new AUC scores showed a similar result (r¼0.11,
p¼ 0.06).
fMRI results
Inter-individual difference in metacognitive ability: AUC score. A sig-
nificant negative correlation between the AUC score and
the metacognition contrast was found in the anterior medial
prefrontal cortex (aPFC; 9, 54, 15; T¼ 4.68; extent¼ 3 voxels;
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P FWE¼ 0.025; Figure 2). The reverse (positive) correlation re-
vealed no significant effects. Since inter-individual differences
in primary task performance (i.e. accuracy in factual and mental
state reasoning) were correlated with AUC scores (r overall accuracy,
AUC¼ 0.37, P< 0.001; r ToM accuracy, ToM AUC¼ 0.11, P¼ 0.06; r non-ToM
accuracy, non-ToM AUC¼ 0.32, P< 0.001; r emotional accuracy, emotional
AUC¼ 0.21, P<0 .001; r neutral accuracy, neutral AUC¼ 0.25, P< 0.001),
an additional analysis was performed to make sure that the
negative correlation between the AUC score and the metacogni-
tion contrast in the aPFC was not confounded by accuracy on
the primary task. Performance (i.e. mean accuracy) in the main
task was regressed out of the total AUC score and the same ana-
lysis was performed again in SPM using an ROI approach (the
aPFC region from our previous analysis as displayed in Figure 2
was used as an ROI). The analysis (thresholded at P¼0.05 uncor-
rected and FWE corrected for the size of the ROI) revealed a very
similar negative correlation between the AUC score and the
metacognition contrast in aPFC (9, 54, 18; T¼ 4.18; P
FWE< 0.001), showing that our main result was not confounded
by inter-individual variability in performance on the primary
task itself.
To check the consistency of the negative correlation be-
tween the AUC score and the metacognition contrast in the
aPFC, we ran the same analysis for AUC scores calculated separ-
ately for ToM, non-ToM, emotional and neutral conditions using
an ROI-based approach (the region displayed in Figure 2 was
used as an ROI). The results (thresholded at P¼0.05 uncorrected
and FWE corrected for the size of the ROI) were similar for each
of the four analyses (Non-ToM: 9, 54, 15; T¼ 4.82; P
FWE< 0.001; ToM: 12, 57, 15; T¼ 2.44; P FWE¼ 0.06; Emotional:
12, 57, 15; T¼ 3.36; P FWE¼ 0.006; Non-Emotional: 9, 54, 18;
T¼ 4.04; P FWE¼ 0.001). No significant correlation between the
condition specific AUC scores was observed outside aPFC in
whole brain analyses. Furthermore, contrast analyses between
these regressors (ToM vs non-Tom and Emotional vs Non-
Emotional) revealed no significant differences between the
conditions. This pattern shows that the result was highly
consistent across the four conditions and thus relates to
metacognition on higher-level reasoning in general, and not to
the specific contents of any individual condition.
Intra-individual differences in confidence ratings. An association
with less confidence was found in the dorsal and anterior med-
ial prefrontal cortex (extending into neighbouring dorsal anter-
ior cingulate and supplementary motor area) and bilateral
orbitofrontal gyrus (extending into neighbouring anterior insula
and inferior frontal gyrus). Other regions significantly associ-
ated with less confidence were the left lingual gyrus, right su-
perior occipital gyrus (extending into superior parietal lobe),
right supramarginal gyrus and left cerebellum. For a full de-
scription of the results see Table 1 and Figure 3.
Brain regions associated with more confidence were found in
bilateral striatum (including caudate and putamen), bilateral
hippocampus and postcentral gyrus (extending into neighbour-
ing precentral gyrus and supplementary motor area). Other re-
gions significantly associated with more confidence were the
right lingual gyrus extending into the bilateral cuneus, left lin-
gual gyrus and right anterior and posterior middle temporal
gyrus. For a full description of the results Table 1 and Figure 3.
We also analysed confidence-related activations individu-
ally for the four conditions of the 2  2 factorial design [emo-
tionality (neutral vs emotional) by ToM demand (non-ToM vs
ToM question). For this, we ran additional first-level models
with separate regressors for confidence rating epochs and their
parametric modulators of the four conditions. Contrasts of the
four parametric modulators were then entered into a 2  2 fac-
torial design (emotionality  ToM demands in the question).
This analysis yielded similar activations for each of the condi-
tions (Supplementary Figures 2 to 5). Contrasting emotional vs
neutral and ToM vs non-ToM showed no significant activations.
A more sensitive ROI approach (small volume correction within
a mask defined by the overall confidence analysis) yielded
stronger confidence-related activations in striate regions for
ToM compared to non-ToM trials (Supplementary Figure 6),
while there were no significant differences between neutral and
emotional trials.
Discussion
Incorrectly evaluating one’s own performance (i.e. poor meta-
cognitive ability), and especially overconfidence, have been sug-
gested to be common causes of faulty decision-making with
potentially serious consequences (Moore and Healy, 2008). In
order to better understand the involved processes we intended
to (i) assess neural correlates of inter-individual differences in
metacognitive accuracy in a large sample that allows reliable
assessment; (ii) assess metacognition during high-level inferen-
tial cognitive processes (iii) assess neural networks underlying
subjective confidence (iv) study the relationship between over-
confidence and metacognitive ability.
Neural correlates of inter-individual differences in
metacognitive accuracy
Increased metacognitive accuracy across individuals was asso-
ciated with less activation in a medial part of aPFC when
making metacognitive assessments. This result corresponds
well with previous studies linking structural and functional
properties of aPFC with metacognitive ability (Baird et al., 2013;
Del Cul, et al., 2009; Fleming et al., 2010; Rounis et al., 2010;
Yokoyama et al., 2010; Fleming et al., 2012; McCurdy et al., 2013;
Fleming et al., 2014).
Fig. 2. Significant negative correlation between the AUC score and the metacog-
nition contrast, shown on a rendered image and coronal, axial and sagital trans-
versal slices with numbers above each slice representing coordinates in MNI
space. L corresponds to left and R to the right side of the brain. Activations are
displayed on a ch256 template using MRIcroGL (http://www.mccauslandcenter.
sc.edu/mricrogl/) software.
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Fig. 3. Significant brain regions associated with more (red) and less (blue) confidence, shown on sagittal slices with numbers above each slice representing coordinates
in X MNI space. L corresponds to left and R to the right side of the brain. Activations are displayed on a ch256 template using MRIcroGL (http://www.mccauslandcenter.
sc.edu/mricrogl/) software.
Table 1. Cluster size and associated peak values for the significant brain regions associated with feeling less and
more confident during metacognition assessment. Only clusters with more than 10 voxels are reported.
Cluster size Peak P value Peak T value MNI coordinates
x y z
Less confident
Left lingual gyrus 209 <0.001 14.92 9 75 6
Dorsal superior frontal gyrus 2288 <0.001 12.10 12 15 60
Midcingulate gyrus <0.001 10.04 3 24 39
Right anterior superior frontal gyrus <0.001 9.87 24 54 27
Right superior occipital gyrus 328 <0.001 9.58 42 81 27
Right superior parietal lobe <0.001 9.17 15 63 54
Left anterior superior frontal gyrus 256 <0.001 9.38 24 51 21
Left anterior insula 236 <0.001 8.41 33 18 12
Left inferior frontal gyrus <0.001 7.03 45 18 3
Left orbitofrontal gyrus <0.001 5.01 51 36 9
Right orbitofrontal gyrus 291 <0.001 8.28 51 24 3
Right orbitofrontal gyrus <0.001 6.10 45 39 9
Right orbitofrontal gyrus <0.001 6.03 33 21 12
Right supramarginal gyrus 30 <0.001 6.36 60 48 30
Left cerebellum 17 0.001 5.69 33 60 30
More confident
Right lingual gyrus 1937 <0.0001 20.31 12 66 3
Right cuneus <0.0001 11.04 15 81 33
Left cuneus <0.0001 9.97 6 90 18
Right Caudate 7715 <0.0001 12.96 12 12 6
Left Caudate <0.0001 12.57 9 12 3
Left Postcentral gyrus <0.0001 12.10 42 27 60
Left lingual gyrus 52 <0.0001 7.94 9 90 12
Left lingual gyrus <0.0001 5.90 21 87 9
Right anterior middle temporal gyrus 65 <0.0001 6.02 60 3 12
Right posterior middle temporal gyrus 18 0.005 5.19 48 66 9
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In contrast to Yokoyama et al. (2010) who reported a positive
correlation between metacognitive accuracy and brain activa-
tion in aPFC, the correlation was negative in our study. Another
fMRI study which tested correlations between inter-individual
differences in metacognition and brain function also found a
negative effect in aPFC (Fleming et al., 2012). However, this result
is more difficult to interpret in terms of directionality, as ‘brain
function’ here refers to the within subject strength of associ-
ation between confidence and aPFC activity, which was in itself
negative. More broadly, most studies that have investigated re-
lationships between cognitive abilities and brain activity have
found negative effects, especially in frontal brain areas, favour-
ing a neural efficiency hypothesis (for reviews see Grill-Spector
et al., 2006; Neubauer and Fink 2009). Moreover, performance
impairment is also typically associated with a reduction in neu-
ral efficiency (e.g. Kanske et al., 2013; Wessa et al., 2013).
However, there is also evidence that contextual factors such as
(subjective) task difficulty can induce positive correlations
(Neubauer and Fink, 2009), potentially explaining the divergent
finding from Yokoyama et al. (2010). Thus, the fact that we find
a negative correlation between metacognitive accuracy and
brain activation in aPFC is not entirely surprising.
Another aspect that has to be taken into account when test-
ing brain-behaviour relationships in terms of inter-individual
differences is sufficiency of statistical power and multiple com-
parison correction (Yarkoni, 2009). As Fleming et al. (2010) noted,
‘testing for regional correlations was carried out without correc-
tion for multiple comparisons, and thus a positive result here
should be tempered by this caveat.’ Moreover, the effect sizes
expected for such analyses of individual differences require
large sample sizes in order to avoid inflation of effects or Type II
errors due to low statistical power (Yarkoni, 2009). Therefore, it
was important to demonstrate that inter-individual differences
in aPFC activation are associated with differences in metacogni-
tive accuracy in a study that has sufficient power and allows for
multiple comparison correction, as done in the present study.
Metacognition in the context of high-level inferential
cognitive processes
Previous studies on the neural processes involved in metacogni-
tion focused on metacognitive judgements of one’s own per-
formance in memory and perception tasks (Del Cul, et al., 2009;
Fleming et al., 2010; Rounis et al., 2010; Yokoyama et al., 2010;
Fleming et al., 2012; Baird et al., 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013;
Fleming et al., 2014). Interestingly, it seems that similar to those
studies, inter-individual differences in metacognition on high-
level reasoning also relate to aPFC function. This suggests that
this region is involved in metacognitive assessments in differ-
ent domains. This was further confirmed by analyses that dif-
ferentiated between different types of questions of the primary
task (mental state inference vs factual reasoning and neutral vs
emotional context of the question), which found similar associ-
ations with aPFC activity in each of these conditions.
The role of the aPFC in metacognition is also in line with a
review of neuroimaging studies by Christoff and Gabrieli (2000)
who found that the aPFC is often involved when internally gen-
erated information needs to be evaluated. Other evidence from
non-human primate studies further point to a critical role of the
aPFC in metacognition. For example, single-cell recordings
in monkeys revealed that specific neurons in the aPFC do not
respond when a monkey makes a decision, but respond later
on when the monkey evaluates its own decision (Tsujimoto
et al., 2010). Humans have better metacognitive abilities than
non-human primates and it has been suggested that the rela-
tive larger size (compared to the rest of the brain) of the aPFC
in humans versus apes is the reason for this (Semendeferi
et al., 2001).
Beyond the general implication of aPFC in metacognition,
several authors have suggested a lateral-medial separation
within aPFC (Fleming and Dolan, 2012; Baird et al., 2013). The
peak voxel found in the present study was located more medial
than in studies that investigated individual differences in meta-
cognition on perception (Fleming et al., 2010; Fleming et al., 2012;
Baird et al., 2013) and closer to a seed region whose connectivity
was correlated with metacognition on memory (Baird et al.,
2013). This indicates that the processes involved in metacogni-
tion on high-level reasoning are more similar to metacognition
on memory than to metacognition on perception. This is con-
sistent with the requirements of the employed task, which
demands inferential processing on information seen in the pre-
vious video and presumably stored in working memory.
Trial-by-trial variation in confidence
Less confidence led to more activation in dorsal medial pre-
frontal cortex, bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex and midcingu-
late cortex. These areas correspond well with the fMRI study on
metacognition by Fleming and colleagues (2012), who found
that these brain areas were more active during metacognition
and less confidence. Others have also associated these regions
with uncertainty in decision making (Volz et al., 2005; Krain
et al., 2006; Potvin et al., 2014). In addition, we found that less
confidence was also associated with more activation in bilateral
lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Meta-analyses on the OFC
have found that the lateral part of the OFC is typically associ-
ated with feelings of displeasure (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004;
Berridge and Kringelbach, 2013). Hsu et al. (2005) also showed
that making decisions in uncertain situations leads to more ac-
tivation in the lateral OFC and that patients with lesions in
these areas are insensitive to the level of uncertainty when
making choices.
More confidence was associated with more activation in bi-
lateral striatum. The peak activation in this area was located in
the caudate, an area often associated with dopamine and
stimulus-action-reward association (Haruno and Kawato, 2006).
Together with the increased activation seen in brain areas often
involved in action execution and preparation such as the post-
central gyrus, precentral gyrus and supplementary motor area,
this pattern suggests that more confidence leads to stronger
connection between the motor response and the positive feel-
ings associated with being more confident about one’s own
choices. Note that these results cannot be explained by duration
of the (motor) response per se as these effects were controlled
for in our fMRI analysis. The link between more confidence and
the dopamine network in the striatum suggests that being con-
fident about one’s choices may be an intrinsically positive ex-
perience. Together with the evidence that brain areas
associated with less confidence are typically involved in dis-
pleasure and uncertainty, this might partially explain why peo-
ple in general prefer to be overconfident about their choices and
intrinsic abilities (Hoorens, 1993; Alicke and Govorun, 2005). The
link between overconfidence and bad judgement was confirmed
in our behavioural results, which showed that when controlling
for mean accuracy, confidence was negatively correlated with
metacognitive ability.
More confidence was also associated with increased activa-
tion in the bilateral hippocampus. This latter result fits well
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with previous metacognition fMRI studies that found this region
to be associated with more confidence, and is consistent with
the view that increased activation in the hippocampus is associ-
ated with better memory retrieval (Chua et al., 2006; Moritz et al.,
2006; Kim and Cabeza, 2009). There were additional brain activa-
tions, which might be a result of the task design. For example,
less confidence was related to more activation in left occipital
cortex, while the opposite (more activation in right occipital cor-
tex) was true for more confidence. This was not surprising be-
cause people systematically had to move the confidence scale
to the left (leading to more visual stimulation (i.e. more letters)
coming from the right visual field because their eyes have now
moved to the left side of the centre) to indicate less confidence.
This increased visual stimulation from the right visual field led
to more activation in the left occipital cortex. The opposite (i.e.
more right occipital cortex activation) is true for sliding the cur-
sor to the right (leading to more visual stimulation from the left
visual field), which indicated more confidence.
The relationship between overconfidence and
metacognitive ability
The potential implication of the association between rated con-
fidence and neural networks involved in processing positive
and negative affect—namely that people tend to overestimate
their confidence in order to feel more positive—has a testable
implication for behavioural performance. Specifically, when
controlling for the true task performance level, a stronger in-
clination to overestimate one’s own performance could under-
mine metacognitive accuracy. In fact, we found that reported
confidence correlated positively with metacognitive accuracy
(as implied by the above chance metacognitive accuracy, cf.
Fleming et al., 2014). Importantly however, this correlation was
negative when controlling for the subjects’ actual task accuracy
level. This indicates that there is a bias to overestimate one’s
performance, which varies between subjects and can under-
mine the accuracy of one’s metacognitive judgement.
Note that the method used to assess metacognitive ability
(trapezoidal approximation of the area under ROC curve) under-
estimates metacognitive accuracy, potentially to a larger extent
in the presence of response bias (i.e. overconfidence). Therefore,
we repeated the analysis with metacognition scores derived
from an independent estimation method not susceptible to
underestimation, which yielded results consistent with the first
analysis. This analysis suggests that the negative correlation is
a true effect rather than a spurious result because of how the
area under the curve was estimated.
Strengths, limitations and future work
One important advantage of our study compared to previous
fMRI studies on metacognition was the large sample size
(N¼ 308). This allowed us to use stringent whole brain FWE cor-
rection and produce reliable results. Especially when using re-
gression analysis in fMRI studies, it is critical that large sample
sizes are used in order to obtain reliable results that represent
true effect sizes (Yarkoni et al, 2009). The low power in neurosci-
ence studies in general has been suggested as the key factor in
producing results that are often not reproducible, which has led
some to conclude that neuroscience research is unreliable and
wasteful (Button et al., 2013).
The design of the EmpaToM task allowed us to study
inter-individual differences in both metacognitive ability
and intra-individual differences in subjective confidence on a
trial-by-trial basis. Moreover, this is the first study to probe neu-
ral correlates of metacognition on high-level social and factual
reasoning. However, a potential limitation in this study was the
absence of a direct control condition for the metacognitive as-
sessment (as there was no condition during which people had
to move the confidence cursor unrelated to their subjective con-
fidence rating). Therefore, we could not identify the network
for metacognitive assessment per se.
Future studies should further investigate if metacognitive
ability relies on similar brain regions across a wide variety of
tasks. The fact that we also find a similar association between
the aPFC and metacognitive ability in our higher-level metacog-
nition study as others previously did in lower level metacogni-
tive studies (Fleming et al., 2010, 2012; Yokoyama et al., 2010),
suggests that the aPFC might be involved in a wide variety of
metacognition assessments. However, some other evidence
points to the contrary. For example, McCurdy and colleagues
(2013) found that although visual and memory metacognitive
efficiency correlated across different tasks, visual metacognitive
efficiency was correlated with brain volume in aPFC, while
memory metacognitive efficiency was correlated with brain vol-
ume in the precuneus. Therefore, future metacognitive fMRI
studies should try to combine different types of metacognitive
assessment in a single study. This will allow more precise con-
clusions about how the underlying neural architecture of
metacognitive ability is influenced by differences in task com-
ponents and complexity. Finally, it seems worthwhile for future
research to consider affective processes as a biasing factor in
metacognitive self-evaluation. Future studies could explicitly
relate such biases to state and trait measures of positive and
negative affect. This might help to further elucidate mechan-
isms which lead to unrealistically high self-assessments (Alicke
and Govorun, 2005), and potentially severe faulty decision
making.
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